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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
  
DuPont Specialty Products (“DuPont”) petitions for review of an Order of the 
National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”) directing it to engage in decision bargaining 
before subcontracting its paid, volunteer Emergency Response Team (the “ERT”).  The 
Board cross-petitions for enforcement of the Order.  On the record before us, we find that 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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substantial evidence supports the Board’s Order.  We will therefore deny the petition for 
review and grant the cross-petition for enforcement.  
I. 
 DuPont produces synthetic fibers at its Spruance Plant in Chesterfield County, 
Virginia (the “Plant” or “Spruance”).  Because of the inherently dangerous nature of this 
process, DuPont has elected to maintain an internal cadre of first responders since at least 
1974.  Until 2018, this service was provided by the ERT.  The ERT was comprised of 
volunteers who held other positions throughout the Plant but could be called at any time to 
respond to emergencies.  This team was made up of both non-union and union members, 
the latter represented by the Ampthill Rayon Workers, Inc. Local 992 (the “ARWI”) and 
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (the “IBEW”).  ERT volunteers were 
compensated for their work and for attending required trainings, often resulting in 
significant overtime pay.   
 In 2018, about a year after Richard Lukhard was appointed the new Chief of 
Emergency Services at Spruance, ARWI and IBEW were informed that DuPont would be 
replacing the ERT with dedicated subcontractors.  According to Lukhard, who oversaw the 
ERT, this decision was motivated by significant safety concerns.  For example, he noted 
that recruiting and training volunteers for the ERT was growing increasingly difficult, 
particularly as more senior members retired.  He also noted the difficulty of ensuring that 
ERT members passed trainings and obtained the required experience to perform their duties 
effectively given the relatively sparce occurrence of emergencies at the Plant.   
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 At a meeting with union representatives, DuPont indicated that it would not bargain 
over its decision to subcontract, but that it was willing to bargain over the effects of its 
decision.  ARWI accordingly filed a charge with the Board’s regional office, alleging that 
DuPont had violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the 
“Act”)1 by refusing to engage in collective bargaining over a “term[] and condition[] of 
employment.”2  Several months later, the Board’s General Counsel issued an unfair-labor-
practice complaint based on this charge.   
An ALJ held a three-day evidentiary hearing, ultimately concluding that DuPont 
had violated the Act as alleged.  Specifically, it discredited Lukhard’s testimony that he 
was motivated by safety concerns when he recommended subcontracting the ERT, finding 
that this rationale was not present in any of the contemporaneous documentary evidence 
and that there was no evidence that Lukhard had shared this concern with the senior 
management ultimately responsible for making the subcontracting decision.  The Board 
adopted the ALJ’s factual findings in full, and entered an Order directing DuPont to engage 
in decision bargaining and to, among other things, compensate the ERT members for lost 
overtime.  
 
1 Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) are codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) and (1). 
 
2 AR 575.  While the charge was pending, DuPont proceeded to implement its 




 DuPont timely filed this petition for review, and the Board cross-petitioned for 
enforcement of its Order.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny DuPont’s petition for 
review and grant the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement. 
II.3 
 Decisions to subcontract fall into a grey area between those that “have only an 
indirect and attenuated impact on the employment relationship” and therefore are never 
subject to mandatory collective bargaining, and those that “almost exclusively” affect “an 
aspect of the relationship between employer and employee” and are therefore always 
subject to collective bargaining.4  Instead, they are categorized as decisions that have “a 
direct impact on employment,” but that are focused on concerns “wholly apart from the 
employment relationship.”5  As such, they only trigger mandatory collective bargaining 
under the Act when “the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective-
bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business.”6  
Consistent with this framework, “[t]he focus in determining whether a particular 
management decision requires bargaining under Section 8(a)(5) is not the employer’s 
decision to subcontract, but whether ‘requiring bargaining over this sort of decision will 
 
3 The Board had jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(a), and this Court has 
jurisdiction over a final Order of the Board pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f).   
 
4 First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677 (1981) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
5 Id.  
 




advance the neutral purposes of the Act.’”7  The relevant inquiry, then, is whether “the 
employer’s decision was prompted by factors . . . within the union’s control and therefore 
‘suitable for resolution within the collective bargaining framework.’”8   
 On appeal, however, DuPont maintains that decisions to subcontract only require 
mandatory collective bargaining when labor cost is their “sole” motivating factor.  In 
support, it looks to language from Dorsey Trailers, Inc. v. NLRB.9  In that case, we stated 
that “[a] company’s decision to subcontract which is based solely on a desire to eliminate 
or reduce overtime is subject to mandatory union bargaining since to require the employer 
to bargain about the matter would not significantly abridge his freedom to manage the 
business.”10  Because the company’s “sole motivation” was not a desire to eliminate 
overtime, the Court concluded that the decision was not subject to mandatory decision 
bargaining.11  However, this language did not displace our longstanding balancing test for 
determining whether a subcontracting decision triggers mandatory bargaining.  Instead, it 
merely contrasted a hypothetical subcontracting decision based purely on cost, which 
would clearly be subject to mandatory bargaining, with the employer’s rationale in that 
case, which was based on “a need to fill orders and maintain a healthy, viable business” in 
 
7 Furniture Rentors of Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 36 F.3d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting 
First Nat’l, 452 U.S. at 681).   
 
8 Id. (quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 214 (1964)).  
 
9 134 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 





the face of a backlog of orders and an inability “to find a qualified pool of experienced 
welders.”12  It is not the case, then, that labor costs must be the company’s “sole” 
motivating factor in order to trigger mandatory bargaining.  At the same time, the 
hypothetical about a decision based solely on labor costs in Dorsey Trailers—which would 
certainly be subject to bargaining—also makes it clear that merely considering some labor 
costs as part of a decision does not automatically make the decision subject to mandatory 
bargaining.  Instead, where labor costs are one among many motives, we employ the fact-
intensive balancing test from First National.   
Applying the appropriate test here, substantial evidence supports the Board’s 
conclusion that DuPont’s decision to subcontract was motivated by factors entirely within 
the union’s control.  Specifically, the Board and the ALJ pointed to PowerPoint slides and 
internal email correspondence showing that though “the actual decision-making process of 
upper management . . . [was] opaque,” the evidence demonstrated “that the anticipated 
savings in overtime and training costs were significant factors, repeatedly emphasized in 
the explanations for the contracting out.”13  The ALJ also credited ARWI’s testimony that 
cost savings was offered as a rationale for the subcontracting decision when the two parties 
met.  As a result, the ALJ found that, although “the substantial evidence of labor cost 
motivation in the decision to subcontract was met with the insistence of [DuPont’s] 
witnesses that cost savings had nothing to do with the matter,” labor costs “were manifestly 
 
12 Id. at 132-33. 
 




a factor in the decision to contract out.”14  Although DuPont “began to omit the cost savings 
rationale from its discussions” once the unfair-labor-practice charge was filed, “[b]ehind 
the scenes, the cost savings to be netted from the contracting of the ERT remained 
important to DuPont.”15  Because of our extremely deferential standard of review,16 and 
because labor costs are traditionally subject to collective bargaining,17 we will deny 
DuPont’s petition for review.   
But that is not to say that we accept all of the ALJ’s factual findings at face value.  
In particular, we note that despite the ALJ’s conclusion that Lukhard’s proposed safety 
rationale was merely “contrived for litigation,”18 various contemporaneous documents 
show that safety was a concern for Lukhard and at least some DuPont employees at the 
outset.  The problem for DuPont, rather, is that none of this evidence shows that safety was 
actually contemplated by the relevant decisionmakers—in other words, by the upper 
management that was ultimately responsible for deciding to subcontract the ERT.  Had 
DuPont wished to rebut the substantial evidence that labor cost was what prompted its 
decision, it could have introduced either documentary or testimonial evidence to this effect.   
 
14 App. at 14. 
 
15 App. at 14. 
 
16 See 1621 Route 22 W. Operating Co., LLC v. NLRB, 825 F.3d 128, 144-45 (3d Cir. 
2016).   
 
17 See Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 213-14.  
 




To be clear, we do not mean to suggest that bargaining is required every time a 
company considers labor costs in its decision-making process; indeed, it is difficult to 
imagine a decision that would not weigh economic factors to some extent.  And where 
safety is concerned, the Board has recognized that if an employer’s subcontracting decision 
is meant to prevent safety risks to the public or to company property, that decision may not 
be subject to mandatory bargaining19—a point which the Board reiterated here.20  We need 
not decide the issue because, based on the record before us, DuPont did not produce 
evidence of a safety rationale on the part of the actual decisionmakers, as it would have 
needed to in order to rebut the evidence showing that labor costs prompted the 
subcontracting decision.  Substantial evidence therefore supports the Board’s finding that 
DuPont’s decision was, in fact, amenable to bargaining. 
III. 
 DuPont raises two additional arguments, neither of which is meritorious.  First, it 
argues that the Board misapplied its “contract coverage” test, as set out in MV 
Transportation, Inc.21  In other words, DuPont maintains that it was not required to bargain 
because its decision to subcontract the ERT was governed by its existing collective 
bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with ARWI.  But the CBA contains no provision covering 
DuPont’s right to unilaterally eliminate ERT work opportunities.  Total silence on the issue 
 
19 See Oklahoma Fixture Co., 314 NLRB 958, 960 (1994). 
 
20 See App. at 15 (citing Oklahoma Fixture, 314 NLRB at 960). 
 




is the opposite of “granting the employer the right to act unilaterally.”22  Second, DuPont 
argues that the ALJ erred by excluding two pieces of safety-related evidence.  We review 
an ALJ’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.23  Here, the ALJ committed no such 
abuse where this evidence would have been cumulative of Lukhard’s testimony and, more 
importantly, went to issues that were never in dispute and would have had minimal 
probative value.  We are therefore unpersuaded that the Board’s decision was unsound for 
any of the reasons proffered by DuPont. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny DuPont’s petition for review and grant the 
Board’s cross-petition for enforcement. 
 
22 Id. at *2.  And, as a practical matter, DuPont routinely bargained with the union over 
changes to the ERT, further undercutting its argument that the unilateral decision to 
suspend the program was covered by the CBA.   
 
23 See NLRB v. Louton, Inc., 822 F.2d 412, 416 (3d Cir. 1987).  
 
 
